

Channel Process

OPERATING PROTOCOL

**Contents**

Introduction and Background......…………………………………...3

Definitions ..............................……………………………………....4

The Local Dimension ………………………………………………..4 - 5

Scope of the Protocol ……………………………………………….5

Thresholds for Violent Extremism …………………………………5 - 6

Vulnerability Indicators………………………………………….......6

The Channel Project……………………………………………........7

The Reporting Process……………………………………………….7 - 8

Key Contacts………………………………………………………….8 – 9

Flowchart………………………………………………………………10

**Introduction and Background**

The threat from violent extremism in this country is real and severe. It can involve the exploitation of vulnerable people, with the aim of drawing them into committing criminal acts of violence and terrorism. This protocol is designed to provide a clear framework with which to respond to safeguarding concerns for those vulnerable individuals who may be at risk of radicalisation. It seeks to provide an early intervention / prevention strategy for professionals who work with those who may be vulnerable to the messages of violent extremism.

The London bombings on 7th July 2005 precipitated the introduction of the Government’s strategy to counter terrorism, which was presented to Parliament in July 2006.[[1]](#footnote-1). The strategy, known as ‘Contest’ provided four main work-streams:

* **Pursue** terrorists and their operations at home and abroad
* **Prepare** for the consequences and improve resilience
* **Protect** – reduce vulnerability of the public and UK interests
* **Prevent** to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism by tackling radicalisation and its underlying cause

In June 2008 the Government published, “The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England” which explained the background to, and content of, the *Prevent* strategy, developed from the fourth work-stream of ‘Contest’. It also provided guidance on the local delivery of the strategy.

With the aim of improving local delivery of the *Prevent* initiative, an updated version of the original document was published in June 2009, in which lessons learned and emerging best practice had been taken into consideration. In turn, this document “Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners” was further reviewed and largely replaced with the new, “*Prevent* Strategy” in June 2011.

The *Prevent* strategy objectives are:

**Identify:** We will work in partnership to better identify and refer those vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism and those who pose a radicalisation risk to others. We will work with communities, local policing, Counter Terrorism policing, public sector, businesses and charities.

**Safeguard**: We will work collaboratively across policing and wider partnerships to safeguard people and divert those vulnerable to radicalisation or being drawn into terrorism.

**Manage Risk**: We will work in partnership using our unique skills and powers to assess, manage, support and disrupt individuals who pose a Counter Terrorism or extremism risk.

**Definitions**

“**Extremism** is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. …. also includes …. calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.”[[2]](#footnote-2)

The Crown Prosecution Service defines “violent extremism” as:

“The demonstration of unacceptable behaviour by using any means or medium to express views which:

* foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs;
* seek to provoke others to terrorist acts;
* foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or
* foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK” [[3]](#footnote-3)

**The Local Dimension**

South Yorkshire was not included in the Government’s list of 25 priority areas to receive funding for activities to address specific local risks.[[4]](#footnote-4) Despite this, application of this protocol is necessary in order that the real threat of individuals being drawn into acts of terrorism is addressed locally. Experience has shown that terrorists, like other criminals, do not operate within geographical boundaries and no community can be considered immune.

Guidance set down in the original Prevent Strategy (June 2008) remains valid, stating that multi-agency working is crucial to the effectiveness of a locally-delivered Prevent programme. A programme of action was to be developed which:

* meets the specific objectives of the Prevent Strategy;
* is jointly agreed and managed by the police, local authority and other partners;
* is proportionate to the level of threat in their area;
* reflects local needs; and
* sets out clear and tangible milestones in tracking progress.”[[5]](#footnote-5)

Such a programme (WRAP) has been developed and implemented. Training for multi-agency partners has been, and continues to be provided, increasing awareness of the issues relating to violent extremism and the recognition of vulnerable groups. This protocol serves to supplement this work and provide a procedure for alerting and reporting concerns about an individual, when radicalisation and potential for future violent extremist behaviour is suspected.

**Scope of the Protocol**

This protocol applies to the prevention of all forms of terrorist or violent extremist activity and the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals. This protocol applies to all partner agencies and organisations with responsibilities for the provision of social care services and seeks to address the second aim of the *Prevent* strategy outlined above.

However, the protocol is not restricted to partner agencies alone. In the interests of the promotion of community cohesion and the ideology and application of the *Prevent* strategy for the prevention of violent extremism, non-partner agencies are also encouraged to apply this protocol and to alert the appropriate safeguarding services as necessary to share any concerns.

Although initial concerns may be focused on an increased susceptibility to terrorism / violent extremism, further enquiries may lead to a different type of vulnerability and risk being identified. It should be emphasised that the overarching principal of this approach is around safeguarding – signposting and information sharing should take place to prevent other types of risk.

**Thresholds for Violent Extremism**

It is not possible to define a ‘typical extremist’ since those involved in terrorism/extremism come from a diverse range of backgrounds and have an equally wide range of experiences.

Research has shown that indicators of vulnerability towards radicalisation may include a range of personal and external factors:

* **Identity** – that the individual feels ‘distance’ from their cultural and religious heritage and radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and a sense of community.
* **Personal Crisis** – individuals often feel tension within the family, experience a sense of isolation or have a low self-esteem. They disassociate from existing friendship groups and are therefore susceptible to becoming involved with new, possibly extremist groups.
* **Personal Circumstances** – local community tensions and events affecting their country or region of origin. They feel alienation from UK values and may feel a sense of grievance, potentially triggered by personal experiences of racism or discrimination or aspects of Government policy.
* **Criminality** – experiences of imprisonment and poor reintegration into society. Individuals may have previous involvement with criminal groups which they find difficult to disassociate from.

Whilst individuals who display these indicators might be vulnerable to radicalisation, such display does not automatically imply that they will follow this route. Other indicators, taken in isolation, or in conjunction with those set out above, can further help to clarify risk.

These are:

* being in contact with extremist groups
* openly supporting violent extremist causes or leaders of extremist groups
* accessing websites with a violent extremist nature
* possessing violent extremist literature
* justifying the use of violence to resolve societal issues and using extremist narratives
* joining extremist organisations[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Vulnerability Indicators**

The Channel process assesses vulnerability using a consistently applied assessment framework, built around three dimensions. The three dimensions are:

* Engagement with a group, cause or ideology;
* Intent to cause harm;
* Capability to cause harm.

The dimensions are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (stop intending to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

The three dimensions are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, 6 that relate to intent and 3 for capability). These factors taken together form a rounded view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether they need support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments, the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment.

**The Channel Project**

In October 2012 the Government published “Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism – a guide for local partnerships” which set out advice for local partnerships on how to deliver Channel projects. The role of this multi-agency panel is to develop appropriate support packages to safeguard those at risk of being drawn into terrorism based upon an assessment of their vulnerability. The panel should be chaired by the Local Authority and include the Channel Police practitioner and other relevant statutory partners.

Channel is a government supported initiative which aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism through an integrated multi agency approach. It is a process that relies on close collaboration between police, partners and other key stakeholders, providing a mechanism for evaluating referred individuals who are perceived to be at risk of being drawn in to terrorism. Channel operates in the pre-criminal space and aims to support vulnerable individuals, through targeted intervention relevant to the individual’s vulnerability and risk, to prevent them from committing criminal acts.

Channel began as a Home Office pilot back in 2007 in two police forces; prior to the Prevent strategy being fully developed. Channel now operates in every Local Authority in England and Wales. Since the inception of Channel, policy and strategy has developed and evolved, resulting in the publication of the National Channel guidance for local partnerships in March 2010.

**The Reporting Process**

1. If a volunteer, member of staff or professional from a partner or non-partner agency has concerns that an individual may be vulnerable to the messages of violent extremism, that person should discuss those concerns with the Police Prevent Team in the first instance. **All contact details for this Team are attached within the Key Contacts section below.**
2. Upon receipt of the information, the South Yorkshire Police designated Prevent officer will:

* Liaise with designated Senior Prevent Officers, Police Channel Practitioners and Prevent Officers from other relevant agencies, as required.
* Provide advice and support for team managers and agency staff.
* Carry out a preliminary assessment to determine the appropriate course of action.

1. Following the preliminary assessment and confirmation that the case is appropriate for Prevent intervention, the referral should pass to the established multi-agency panel (called the Channel Panel), which is Chaired by the Local Authority.
2. The multi-agency panel, using their professional expertise, will develop a support package. This will be based on a review of the vulnerability assessment completed by the Channel police practitioner at the preliminary assessment stage.
3. Multi-agency panel members should consider sharing any further information for the purposes of Channel, subject to a case-by-case assessment of necessity, proportionality and lawfulness. Wherever possible, the informed consent of the individual should be obtained.
4. The panel may conclude that the individual is better suited to alternative support mechanisms or that further assessment indicates that the individual is not vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. In such cases the Chair of the panel is responsible for confirming the recommendation and ensuring that the decision is properly recorded.
5. All cases dealt with by the multi-agency panel should be reviewed at 6 months and 12 months, from the point at which they exit the process, by senior managers.

**Key Contacts**

**South Yorkshire Police Prevent Team**

Business Hours - As below

Out of Hours - Emergency 999

Out of Hours - Non-emergency 101

Prevent Staff operate on call via the 101 - 24/7 365

Prevent internal email: Prevent\_Inbox@southyorks.pnn.police.uk

Report Extremist Material: <https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism>

Preventing Terrorism: [www.ltai.info](http://www.ltai.info/)

Act Early: <https://actearly.uk/>

North East Counter Terrorism Unit: [www.northeastctu.police.uk](http://www.northeastctu.police.uk/)

UK Anti-Terrorist Hotline Number: 0800 789 321

NaCTSO website is[www.nactso.gov.uk](http://www.nactso.gov.uk) (lockdown & protected space guidance)

**Prevent Contacts for training / guidance:**

* **Doncaster MBC –** Rachael Long, Crime and Community Safety Theme Manager, 01302 737469 (Channel Co-ordinator)
* **Doncaster MBC** – Bill Hotchkiss, Head of Service, Communities Safer Stronger, 01302 737831 (Channel Chair)

The diagram below shows the different stages within the Channel process, for information:

|  |
| --- |
| **Identification** |

|  |
| --- |
| **Exit**  Or referral to alternative support |

|  |
| --- |
| **Screen Referrals**   * Screen referral to ensure there is a specific vulnerability around radicalisation and the referral is not malicious or misinformed * Maintain proper record |

**Appropriate**

|  |
| --- |
| **Preliminary Assessment**   * Determine suitability (alternative support mechanisms) * Collective assessment of vulnerability and risk |

**Seek endorsement**

|  |
| --- |
| **Multi-Agency Panel**   * Review of vulnerability assessment and risk * Collective assessment of support needs * Develop support plan * Identify and procure appropriate support packs * Review progress |

**Review**

|  |
| --- |
| Delivery of Support Package   * Review panel decisions at 6 and 12 months |

1. Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, Cm 6888, July 2006 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Prevent* Strategy, Cm 8092, June 2011, page 107 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), 2011 at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent\_extremism.html [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. *Prevent* Strategy, Cm 8092, June 2011, page 97 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. leading the preventing violent extremism agenda, Local Government Association (LGA), Nov 2008, page 7 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Pan Greater Manchester Procedure for Working with Adults who are Vulnerable to the Messages of Violent Extremism – A Targeted Safeguarding Approach, January 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)